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 ABSTRACT  
 
This paper attempts to re-evaluate the size of housing wealth effect in Korea. Our focus is on the 
size of ‘genuine’ housing wealth effect, i.e., the response of consumption spending by home-owners 
to the changes in housing wealth. 
Two issues show up while we estimate the ‘genuine’ wealth effects using aggregate time series 
data: the issues around home ownership and proper measure of consumption. We first argue that it is 
more appropriate to use non-housing consumption, because housing consumption is in large part not 
of the choice of home owners but the imputed rents they do not actually choose to pay.  
We then proceed to address the issue of home ownership, by examining how much to revise the 
estimates of housing wealth effect obtained from aggregate non-housing consumption data. We 
construct two structural models and estimate the share of home-owners' consumption in those 
models' context. It is found that, if properly revised in light of the estimated consumption shares of 
home-owners, the magnitude of resulting housing wealth effects are larger than what simple time 
series regressions imply. 
 
 
 
 
본고에서 우리는 한국의 주택 부 효과의
크기를 재검토한다. 이를 위해 주택가격 상
승에 대한 주택 보유자 소비지출의 반응인
‘순수한’ 주택 부 효과의 크기를 알아보는
데 중점을 둔다. 
순수한 주택 부 효과를 측정하기 위해 거
시시계열 자료를 이용할 경우, 주택 보유여
부와 적절한 소비지출변수의 선정이라는
두 가지 문제가 제기된다. 우리는 먼저 비
주택 소비(non-housing consumption)가
보다 적절한 소비지출변수임을 보이며, 그
이유로 주택소비(housing consumption)
의 상당 부분이 주택 보유자들의 실제로 지
  
불하지 않는 귀속임대료(imputed rents)
임을 제시한다.  
이어서 우리는 거시시계열 자료로부터 
구한 주택 부 효과의 크기를 얼마나 수정
해야 주택보유자에의 순수한 주택 부 효
과를 추정할 수 있는가를 살펴본다. 이를 
위해 두 개의 구조적 모형을 설정하여, 
전체 소비지출 중에서 주택 보유자 소비
지출의 비중을 추정한다. 주택 보유자의 
소비지출 비중을 감안하여 수정된 주택 
부의 효과는, 거시시계열을 이용하여 구
한 통상적인 주택 부 효과의 추정치보다 
크게 나타난다. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
The last decade witnessed dramatic changes in housing prices in many countries. 
According to Sutton (2002), housing prices in the U.S. increased by 21% net of 
inflation from 1995-2001, and the real rates of increases in housing prices reached 
42%, 60%, and 70% in the U.K., Netherlands, and Ireland, respectively, during the 
same period. In this respect, Korea is no exception: during 2001:Q1- 2004:Q2, the 
nominal and real prices of apartment units in the Seoul metropolitan area rose by 
68.8% and 52.1%, respectively.  
Such steep rises in housing prices are naturally expected to affect aggregate 
demand and economic activities. The logic is simple: with housing wealth taking the 
lion’s share of household wealth, a rise in housing prices or housing wealth increases 
consumption spending via increased consumer confidence, remortgaging against the 
higher value of housing, and so on. In a standard permanent income model, 
moreover, higher housing wealth should lead to increases in consumption even 
when there are bequest motives or borrowing constraints.  
In contrast to such clear theoretical predictions, however, empirical evidence on 
the magnitude of the housing wealth effect is mixed: for example, Case, Quigley, and 
Shiller (2005) report that the elasticity of consumption with respect to the housing 
wealth ranges from 0.1 to 0.17 in the panel analyses of 14 major countries, but 
Girouard and Blondal (2001) estimate the elasticities for the U.S., U.K., and France to 
be 0.02, 0.06, and 0.08, respectively, which are much lower than in Case, Quigley, and 
Shiller. 
 The aim of this paper is to estimate the magnitude of housing wealth effect in 
Korea. Unlike many previous exercises in the literature focusing mainly on the 
macroeconomic implications of housing wealth, our interest lies in understanding 
the ‘genuine’ form of housing wealth effects, i.e., the response of consumption 
spending by home-owners, not the aggregate consumption spending, to the changes 
in housing wealth. Our view here is that the idea of housing wealth effects per se is 
applicable to home-owners, as the logic aforementioned assumes implicitly. 
Given that most available data for estimating housing wealth effects are 
aggregate macro time series, however, the task of estimating the size of genuine 
housing wealth effects raises two possibly interwoven issues. The first one is the 
issue of home ownership, around which an intuitive story would go as follows: 
while home-owners may well perceive housing price increases as an addition to their 
wealth and therefore increase their consumption, renters planning to purchase their 
own homes (and home-owners wanting to trade up) may decrease their 
consumption as they will have to save more for higher down payments and 
repayments. That being the case, the sensitivity of aggregate consumption with 
respect to housing wealth will understate the size of genuine housing wealth effects. 
The second issue is about using proper measures of consumption in estimating 
the effects of housing wealth. Here, we note that aggregate consumption in national 
income accounts comprises non-housing and housing consumption, and that the 
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latter is proxied by what is actually paid by renters living in similar housing units. 
Higher housing prices, usually accompanied by higher housing rental prices, will 
induce renters to change their non-housing and housing consumption via the 
standard substitution and income effects channel. To the extent that most people buy 
a house to live in, however, the changes in housing consumption by home owners 
are not of their own choices but artificially imputed on them. That being the case, 
using aggregate consumption including housing consumption is likely to yield 
inaccurate estimates of the ‘genuine’ housing wealth effect we are interested in. 
We set off by addressing the second issue using macro time series data. To do so, 
we estimate the elasticity of housing and non-consumption with respect to gross 
housing value. Regression results support the presence of significant housing wealth 
effects on non-housing consumption, while higher housing values tend to 
significantly lower housing consumption. Up to a caveats discussed later, we 
interpret these findings as supporting our view that non-housing consumption is a 
more appropriate measure of consumption spending when using aggregate time 
series to estimate housing wealth effects.  
Even if non-housing consumption is used as the measure of consumption, the 
remaining issue around the home ownership is to be resolved. After an increase in 
housing rental price that usually accompany higher housing prices, renters left with 
less discretionary resources are likely to lower non-housing consumption. Compared 
to what would result from the regressions with home-owners’ consumption only, 
therefore, the aggregate time series estimates of housing wealth effects will be biased 
downward, and the size of bias will increase with the proportion of renters’ 
consumption out of total.  
That being the case, one natural suggestion would be to separately track down 
home-owners’ consumption and use this information in estimating the ‘genuine’ 
housing wealth effect. Unfortunately, no time data series is available of this 
characteristic. Therefore, we use cross sectional data for home-owners to obtain a set 
of benchmark estimates for genuine housing wealth effect. We then proceed to 
estimate the share of home-owners’ consumption, and use the results to re-interpret 
the time series estimates of housing wealth effects. More specifically, we set up two 
simple structural models of an economy populated by home-owners and renters, 
and estimate the consumption shares of each consumer group. It turns out that, if 
revised based on the estimated consumption shares, the size of housing wealth 
effects is larger than what simple time series regressions tell us and the benchmark 
estimates from the cross sectional estimation. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we estimate the housing wealth 
effect in Korea with aggregate time series as well as cross section data, and see if the 
estimation results are consistent with the concept of housing wealth effects we are 
interested in. In Section 3, we construct two structural models to estimate the 
consumption shares of home-owners and renters, and use those results to revise the 
estimated size of housing wealth effects from the time series data. Section 4 
concludes. 
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II. Measuring Housing Wealth Effect 
 
 
1. Time Series Results 
 
In trying to estimate housing wealth effects with aggregate time series data, we 
focus on the long-run relationships (rather than short-run correlations) among 
consumption, income, and wealth. This estimation strategy stems from the view that 
the wealth effect is more of long-run nature: a representative consumer's 
inter-temporal budget constraint dictates that, when one’s wealth rises, additional 
spending will occur over lifetime. Considering the possibility that consumption 
responds to changes in asset value with a substantial lag or over a long time period, 
it is more appropriate to estimate the wealth effect from a long-run perspective. 
In this context, long-run relationships have previously been estimated by 
cointegrating regressions: for example, building on Campbell and Mankiw (1989), 
Lettau and Ludvigson (2000) derive from a representative consumer's intertemporal 
budget constraint a long-run relationship among consumption, labor income and 
asset wealth, and show that they should be cointegrated. 
Our point of departure is to set up regression equations appropriate for 
measuring housing wealth effects. To do so, we resort to a simple model in which a 
representative consumer maximizes utility of the form 
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In the utility function above, C1 and C2 are non-housing and housing 
consumption, respectively. The two price terms P1 and P2 in the budget constraint 
are the price of non-housing and housing consumption, respectively. Finally, (Y, HW, 
SW) denote labor income, housing wealth, and other financial wealth, respectively, 
all in real terms.  
Combining the FOCs for utility maximization with the budget constraint, we 
obtain log-linear relations by which the two kinds of consumption are represented in 
terms of the relative price (P= P2 / P1), labor income (Y), housing wealth (HW), and 
other financial wealth (SW). Based on these results, we estimate the following 
equation 
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where =0,1, and 2 denotes the total consumption, non-housing consumption, 
and housing consumption, respectively.
i
1  
A few things are worth mentioning in the equation (1). First, the relative price (P) 
is necessary to accurately fathom the size of housing wealth effects: the relative price 
term in equation (1) controls for the possible substitution effects (between and 
2 ) of changes in the price of housing consumption, usually accompany changes is 
housing prices and housing wealth.
1C
C
2 Second, as shown in the appendix, while the 
coefficient P for housing consumption is expected to have a negative, that for 
non-housing consumption can be either positive or negative, depending on the 
degree of substitution between and .
β
1C 2C 3
When actually estimating the equation (1), we use the following data 
series:4housing consumption series is the imputed rent payments, which is proxied 
by spending on housing, water, electricity, gas and other fules 5 . Non-housing 
consumption is calculated as the sum of the other components of household 
consumption. Both consumption series for and are measured in real terms. 
Real Gross National Income is used for labor income. Income and all consumption 
series are seasonally adjusted. Housing wealth is constructed as the product of a 
nationwide housing price index and the linearly interpolated annual series on the 
number of dwellings, deflated by CPI (seasonally adjusted) to obtain a real series. 
The value of stock held by individuals available from the flow of funds table is used 
for other financial wealth and is also deflated by CPI.  
1C 2C
For the relative price of housing consumption, two different data series are used. 
The first one, dubbed Pdef, is simply the ratio of deflators for housing and 
non-housing consumption. The second one, more akin to the user costs of housing 
service and hence dubbed Puc, is constructed to reflect real housing rental cost. More 
specifically, we multiply the nationwide chonsei price index with real interest rate, 
where the latter is corporate bonds yield rate minus year-on-year inflation rate for 
CPI.6 All series, except for the user cost of housing consumption, are transformed 
into per capita terms. 
Table 1 reports the estimation results for the three consumption series.7 The first  
                                            
1 Steps involved and the resulting log-linear relations are given in the appendix. 
2 We originally resort to a rather ad-hoc version of regression equation (1), leaving the relative price of housing 
consumption out. An anonymous referee pointed this out and suggested we derive the regression specification from an 
optimization model. His/her comments are deeply appreciated.  
3 The higher the elasticity of substitution between the two types of consumption is, the more likely the coefficient of P 
for housing consumption is to be positive. 
4 All data series are obtained from the Economic Statistics System of the BOK, except for the nationwide chonsei 
price index taken from the Kookmin Bank’s real estate database. 
5 Imputed rents may not be appropriate to proxy for housing consumption because, as an anonymous referee points 
out, imputed rents could fluctuate along with changes in user costs even though the amount of housing stock is 
constant. However, our intention here is to compare the sensitivities of various consumption data to housing wealth. 
Thus, we decide to use ‘housing consumption’ defined as in this section, probably at the risk of using a misnomer.  
6 The OTC rate series for AA- grade corporate bonds with 3-year maturity is used. 
7 ADF statistics for the data series could not reject the null of unit roots. Also, residual based ADF tests support the 
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<Table 1> Time Series Regression 
 
Consump-tion Total Non-Housing Housing 
Relative 
Price Pdef Puc Pdef Puc Pdef Puc
Const. 0.638 (1.433) 
-0.277 
(-1.298) 
1.153 
(2.078) 
0.095 
(0.358) 
-4.432 
(-7.518) 
-4.748 
(-17.895 
P -0.104 (-2.612) 
-0.011 
(-1.553) 
-0.115 
(-2.335) 
-0.009 
(-1.044) 
-0.056 
(-1.070) 
-0.020 
(-2.293) 
Y 1.102 (27.372) 
1.018 
(40.741) 
1.131 
(22.547) 
1.037 
(33.314) 
0.986 
(18.121) 
0.920 
(29.643) 
HW 0.036 (1.525) 
0.044 
(1.770) 
0.110 
(3.726) 
0.118 
(3.810) 
-0.322 
(-10.207) 
-0.311 
(-10.126) 
SW -0.009 (-0.464) 
-0.015 
(-0.750) 
-0.022 
(-0.914) 
-0.030 
(-1.205) 
0.054 
(2.123) 
0.056 
(2.288) 
2
R  0.993 0.992 0.989 0.989 0.987 0.989 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
 
 
panel shows that the estimated elasticity of total consumption with respect to both 
housing and stock wealth is either statistically insignificant or of the wrong signs. 
Using different series for the relative price of housing consumption does not alter 
these results. In contrast, as shown in the second panel, the estimation results for 
non-housing consumption support the presence of significant housing wealth effect. 
The elasticity of non-housing consumption with respect to housing wealth is 
estimated to be sizable amounting to 0.110 and 0.118, depending on which relative 
price series is used, and in both cases the estimates are statistically significant. When 
it comes to the size of stock wealth effects, the estimated coefficient of stock wealth 
turns out to be insignificant, as in the case of the total consumption8. The estimated 
coefficient on the relative price term is -0.115 when Pdef is used, but the estimated 
coefficient on Puc is insignificant and negligible. This implies that the non-housing 
and housing consumption are not close substitutes. 
The third panel of Table 1 reports the estimation results for housing consumption. 
We first note that the estimated coefficients on the relative price terms have signs 
consistent with the theoretical prediction developed in the appendix, although the 
coefficient on Pdef is not significant. It turns out that, however, the estimated 
coefficients on housing wealth are significantly negative: as discussed in the 
                                                                                                               
presence of cointegration in all regressions.  
8 The larger effect of housing wealth on consumption than of stock wealth is also reported in Case, Quigley and 
Shiller (2005). 
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appendix, the predicted sign of housing wealth effects on housing consumption is  
<Table 2> Time Series Regression (Consumptions by Type) 
 
Consum. Durable Non-durable Service 
Relative 
Price Pdef Pdef Pdef Puc Pdef Puc
Const. 1.506 (0.700) 
0.973 
(1.012) 
-6.471 
(-12.516) 
-3.986 
(-16.316) 
2.983 
(3.420) 
-0.878 
(-2.116) 
P 0.037 (0.193) 
0.070 
(2.242) 
0.311 
(6.713) 
0.051 
(6.427) 
-0.481 
(-6.153) 
-0.077 
(-5.746) 
Y 1.428 (7.344) 
1.462 
(12.989) 
0.412 
(8.817) 
0.665 
(23.254) 
1.427 
(18.090) 
1.037 
(21.356) 
HW 0.261 (2.269) 
0.229 
(2.055) 
0.034 
(1.227) 
0.003 
(0.112) 
-0.162 
(-3.466) 
-0.115 
(-2.384) 
SW 0.006 (0.064) 
-0.016 
(-0.176) 
-0.008 
(-0.335) 
0.003 
(0.139) 
0.081 
(2.1148) 
0.064 
(1.676) 
2
R  0.931 0.936 0.981 0.980 0.977 0.975 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
 
 
positive, once the effects of the changes in the relative price of housing consumption 
is correctly controlled for. The theoretically unwarranted signs of the coefficients on 
housing wealth point to the possibility that the relative price series (and probably the 
housing consumption series as well) has not been constructed properly. That being 
the case, the coefficients on housing wealth in the second column of the table may 
not reflect the pure housing wealth effect on non-housing consumption net of any 
substitution effect. Notwithstanding, the results in Table 1 suggest the presence of 
strong housing wealth non-housing consumption. This finding also implies that the 
primary channel of hosing wealth effects on macroeconomy is via non-housing 
consumption.  
The distinction of housing and non-housing consumption in Table 1 is based on 
the categorization of consumption by purpose in the NIA. To understand the effect of 
housing wealth on consumption along a different dimension, we estimate equation 
(1) with the following types of consumption categorized by type: expenditures on 
durables, non-durables, and service. The results are reported in Table 2, where the 
estimated housing wealth effects are conspicuous for expenditure on durables. More 
specifically, one percent increase in housing wealth tends to increase expenditures 
on durables by 0.23% to 0.26%, depending on which relative price series is used. For 
non-durables, the estimated housing wealth effects are not significant. Another 
interesting finding in Table 2 is that the coefficients on relative price and housing for 
expenditures for service are both negative, as shown in the last column. This feature, 
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reminiscent of the results for housing consumption in Table 1, is probably due to the  
<Table 3> Time Series Regression (Lagged Housing Wealth) 
 
Consump-tion Total Non-Housing Housing 
Relative 
Price Pdef Puc Pdef Puc Pdef Puc
Const. 0.746 (1.590) 
-0.346 
(-1.539) 
1.405 
(2.314) 
-0.016 
(-0.054) 
-5.019 
(-7.723) 
-4.621 
(-15.814) 
P -0.116 (-2.910) 
-0.011 
(-1.499) 
-0.145 
(-2.827) 
-0.010 
(-1.095) 
0.018 
(0.326) 
-0.014 
(-1.499) 
Y 1.112 (27.283) 
1.017 
(40.410) 
1.155 
(21.903) 
1.035 
(31.644) 
0.912 
(16.157) 
0.927 
(28.353) 
HW 0.028 (1.178) 
0.028 
(1.091) 
0.097 
(3.138) 
0.095 
(2.853) 
-0.306 
(-9.2197) 
-0.294 
(-8.890) 
SW -0.004 (-0.189) 
-0.009 
(-0.441) 
-0.014 
(-0.585) 
-0.022 
(-0.847) 
0.049 
(1.858) 
0.054 
(2.101) 
2
R  0.993 0.992 0.988 0.987 0.985 0.986 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
 
 
fact that a sizable portion of service consumption is taken by housing consumption, 
which in turn comprises spending on housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels 
as explained before. 
One problem with equation (1) is that the regression specification may be subject 
to the endogeneity of regressors, especially for housing wealth. To address this, we 
experiment with estimating equation (1) with the lagged housing wealth instead of 
the current housing wealth. The results are reposted in Table 3, where the second 
panel shows that the estimated coefficients on lagged housing wealth for 
non-housing consumption are slightly lower than those in Table 2. Our 
interpretation is that using lagged housing wealth helps correct the problem of 
endogeneity at least partially. Other than this finding, the results in Table 3 are 
qualitatively not different from those in Table 1. 
Going back to the issue of proper measure of consumption for housing wealth 
effect, our results of time series regression in Table 1 to Table 3 support the use of 
non-housing consumption in estimating housing wealth effects. Even if one focuses 
on non-housing consumption, however, there is another reason why one may not 
obtain precise estimates of housing wealth effects from aggregate time series data. It 
is because the “genuine” definition of the housing wealth effect is appropriate for 
home-owners, but aggregate non-housing consumption is the sum of renters' 
consumption and home-owners’ consumption. For renters, the rise in property price 
will induce the substitution away from housing consumption toward non-housing 
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consumption, to the extent that higher housing price accompany higher rental price.
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Left with less disposable resources, however, renters will also decrease both housing 
and non-housing consumptions. Unless the elasticity of substitution between 
housing and non-housing consumption is sufficiently large, renters' non-housing 
consumption will decrease. Even if the elasticity is large enough, the responsiveness 
of renters’ non-housing consumption will be significantly lower than that of 
home-owners. 
When using time series data, therefore, one natural suggestion would be to 
separately track down home-owners’ and renters’ consumption and to take this 
information into account in estimating the ‘genuine’ housing wealth effect. 
Unfortunately, no time series data is available of this characteristic. In the following 
subsection, therefore, we use cross sectional data for home-owners to obtain a set of 
benchmark estimates for genuine housing wealth effect. We then proceed in section 3 
to estimate the share of home-owners’ consumption, and use the results to 
re-interpret the time series estimates of housing wealth effects. 
 
 
2. Cross Section Results  
 
To estimate housing wealth effects from cross sectional data, we use the 
following regression  
 
tjtjztjhtjytj XHWYC ,,,,0, εββββ ++++=                            (1)  
 
where ( )tjtjtj ,,,  denotes total consumption expenditure, household 
income, and housing wealth, respectively, of the  household at period t. The 
vector X of controls includes lagged dependent variable(LDV), financial wealth(FW), 
household size(Size), the years of education(Edu), the age of household heads(Age), 
and the square terms of age(Age
HWYC ,,
thj
2).  All variables are in logarithmic terms except the 
household size, years of education, age, and square of age. The data series used are 
taken from the Korea Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) spanning 2000-2004.  
Table 4 shows the estimation results for equation (2) for six specifications. In the 
first four  specifications estimated by pooled regressions, we include both the time 
and region dummies (the estimated coefficients are not reported), in order to control 
for differing effect of explanatory variables on consumption across different business 
cycle and regional conditions. In the latter two specifications estimated by panel 
regressions, only the time dummy is included. 
In specification (i), we include as independent variables current housing and 
financial wealth, where in specification (ii) LDV is also included as a control. For 
these two specifications, the estimated coefficients on housing wealth are positive 
and statistically significant. Although the inclusion of LDV in specification (ii) lowers 
the estimated coefficient on both types of wealth, this does not necessarily mean that 
the size of housing wealth effects is smaller: the long-run effects of housing wealth 
on consumption, i.e., 0.057/(1-0.351) = 0.088, is comparable to 0.091 in specification 
(i). Also, the magnitude of financial wealth effect turns out to be less than half the 
size of housing wealth effect. 
As in the time series regression (1), estimating equation (2) using cross section  
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<Table 4> Cross Sectional Regressions (total consumption) 
 
Pooled Regression Panel Regression 
 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Constant 2.449 (10.08) 
1.465 
(6.34) 
2.429 
(13.09) 
1.491 
(8.57) 
4.710 
(7.25) 
2.582 
(13.41) 
LDV - 
0.351 
(20.90) - 
0.403 
(19.75) - - 
Y 
0.366 
(34.91) 
0.288 
(27.60) 
0.335 
(25.29) 
0.231 
(17.71) 
0.203 
(7.56) 
0.324 
(23.00) 
HW 
0.091 
(9.22) 
0.057 
(6.08) - -   
HW-1 - - 
0.099 
(8.12) 
0.060 
(5.35) 
0.053 
(2.10) 
0.094 
(7.80) 
FW 
0.040 
(7.56) 
0.015 
(2.87)  -   
FW-1 - - 
0.048 
(7.44) 
0.028 
(4.71) 
-0.015 
(-1.51) 
0.034 
(5.41) 
Size 0.102 (15.62) 
0.052 
(8.02) 
0.111 
(13.33) 
0.052 
(6.46) 
0.038 
(1.03) 
0.114 
(11.77) 
Edu 0.110 (11.51) 
0.067 
(7.28) 
0.118 
(9.90) 
0.063 
(5.78) 
0.120 
(1.76) 
0.136 
(9.75) 
Age 
0.032 
(7.50) 
0.016 
(4.01) 
0.031 
(5.29) 
0.013 
(2.46) 
0.022 
(1.02) 
0.033 
(5.00) 
Age2
-0.000 
(-7.70) 
-0.000 
(-4.11) 
-0.000 
(-5.94) 
-0.000 
(-3.03) 
-0.000 
(-0.93) 
-0.000 
(-5.54) 
Time 
dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region 
dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
2R  0.68 0.72 0.69 0.75 0.64 0.68 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
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data can be subject to the endogenity problem.9 In an attempt to partially lessen this 
problem, we experiment with using one lags of housing and financial wealth. 10 The 
specifications (iii) and (iv) correspond to these experiments, where the estimated 
housing wealth effect is slightly larger than those for specifications (i) and (ii): when 
we use lagged wealth data instead of the current data, the coefficient on housing 
wealth changes from 0.091 to 0.099 in the absence of LDV, In the presence of LDV, 
the long-run coefficient on housing wealth changes from 0.087 to 
0.060/(1-0.403)=0.101.  
Although the time span of our data is relatively short, we consider two 
specifications of panel regression, where specification (v) and (vi) employ fixed 
effects and random effects regressions, respectively. The coefficients on housing 
wealth in these cases are comparable to those for the pooled regression specifications, 
except that the housing wealth effect estimated by fixed effect regression is the 
smallest among the six specifications we used. 
In Table 5, we report the estimation results for consumption expenditures on 
durables, non-durables, and service. Noticeably, the estimated coefficients on 
housing wealth are significant for all types of consumption, regardless of the current 
or lagged housing wealth as a regressor. Another interesting finding is that, unlike 
the time series results in Table 2, the estimated housing wealth effect is now most 
conspicuous for service both in terms of its size and significance. This discrepancy 
results because the time series data on service consumption include housing 
consumption (or its proxy), while the cross section data do not. Therefore, we 
interpret this finding as supporting our claim in the previous subsection that housing 
consumption should not be considered when measuring housing wealth effect using 
macro time series data. We also note in Table 5 that housing wealth has larger effect 
on durable consumption than on non-durables, similarly in Table 2 for time series 
results: where current housing wealth is used, the coefficient on housing wealth for 
durable consumption is 0.097, larger than 0.040 for non-durables.  
In summary, the results of cross sectional regressions in Tables 4 and 5 support 
the presence of housing wealth effects among home-owners:  overall, households 
with 1% higher level of housing wealth spends more on total consumption by 
around 0.1% in the long-run. 
 
Estimation of Consumption Shares  
In the previous section, we emphasized the importance of considering home 
ownership profiles when one measures housing wealth effects using aggregate time 
series. One way to address this issue is to revise the time series estimates of housing 
wealth effects in view of the relative weight on home-owners’ consumption. In this 
section, therefore, we attempt to estimate the share of home-owners’ consumption in  
                                            
9 The problem of endogeneity in (2) can be illustrated as follows: to the extent that the permanent income of 
household is the primary determinants of consumption and housing unit choices, the housing wealth is likely to be 
endogenous. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
10 While the consumption in year t is the total flow over the year, housing wealth in tear t is its stock value in the 
mid-year. By using lagged housing wealth, therefore, we can circumvent the problem of explaining the past 
consumption (over the first half of the year) by the housing wealth as of June.  
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<Table 5> Cross Sectional Regressions (Consumptions by type) 
 
 Durables Non-durables Service 
Constant 0.697 (2.15) 
1.292 
(2.98) 
3.535 
(12.57) 
3.384 
(15.13) 
1.339 
(3.98) 
2.522 
(4.62) 
Y 
0.389 
(15.71) 
0.359 
(11.24) 
0.204 
(17.08) 
0.210 
(13.26) 
0.304 
(20.97) 
0.252 
(13.45) 
HW 
0.097 
(4.35) - 
0.040 
(3.52) - 
0.133 
(9.75) - 
HW-1 - 
0.071 
(2.53) - 
0.076 
(5.19) - 
0.136 
(7.87) 
FW 
0.049 
(4.19) - 
0.019 
(3.13)  
0.045 
(6.08) - 
FW-1 - 
0.033 
(2.29) - 
0.022 
(2.86) - 
0.060 
(6.59) 
Size 
-0.006 
(-0.44) 
0.005 
(0.28) 
0.109 
(14.43) 
0.101 
(10.15) 
0.141 
(15.58) 
0.165 
(14.00) 
Edu 
0.071 
(3.51) 
0.131 
(5.28) 
0.076 
(6.89) 
0.058 
(4.10) 
0.144 
(10.82) 
0.151 
(9.04) 
Age 
0.012 
(1.21) 
0.002 
(0.17) 
0.007 
(1.51) 
-0.006 
(-0.84) 
0.037 
(6.22) 
0.022 
(2.69) 
Age2
-0.000 
(-1.08) 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
-0.000 
(-1.22) 
0.000 
(0.72) 
-0.000 
(-6.87) 
-0.000 
(-3.7-) 
2R  0.21 0.21 0.40 0.43 0.56 0.57 
 
 
the context of dynamic structural models using macro time series. 
We consider two simple infinite horizon models of an endowment economy, both 
of which are populated by home-owners and renters. In the first model, households 
maximize lifetime utility defined over non-housing consumption ( 1C ) and housing 
consumption ( 2C ). The sole difference between home-owners and renters in this 
model is that only the former group has access to the market for housing investment 
goods. In the second model, renters are further restricted to be “rule-of-thumb” 
consumers in the sense of Campbell and Mankiw (1989), living on their current 
income period by period. 
Our approach belongs to literature on the estimation of the Euler equation 
including Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Jappelli and Pagano (1989), and Iacoviello 
(2004): we first derive optimality conditions for each group of households, combine 
14    韓國開發硏究 / 2008. Ⅱ  
 
 
them into an aggregate Euler equation, and estimate the consumption weight on 
home-owners. 
 
 
3. Model (I) 
 
3.1 Home-owners 
 
A representative home-owner maximizes a standard lifetime utility given by 
 
( )∑∞
=
−
−0
/11
210 ,/11
1
t
O
t
O
t
t CCuE σσβ , 10 << β , 0>σ                      (3) 
 
for all . The home-owner derives utility from non-housing consumption 
t1  and housing service consumption 2 , priced at t1  and t2 , respectively. 
We assume that the instantaneous utility 
0≥t
OC OtC P P( )tt CCu 21 ,  is a CES aggregator of the 
form: 
 
( ) ,)1(, 12111121 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+=
−−
ε
ε
εε
ε
ε ωω CCCCu tt   10 << ω ,  0>ε .          (4) 
 
The representative home owner receives a random real endowment t , lends 
(or borrow)  in real terms, and receives the real gross interest payment  
in the next period. He also purchases ht  units of housing stock priced at t  for 
investment. The housing stock evolves according to 
OY
O
tB
O
ttBR
I Q( ) ttt+1 , where h HIH δ−+= 1δ  is the rate of depreciation for the existing housing stock. He leases t  units of 
housing stock at the price of t  to a housing service firm, which in turn produces 
and provides housing service  at the price of . Therefore, the budget 
constraint of a home-owner is 
H
Z
tC2 tP2
 
O
tttt
O
tt
O
tt
O
tttt
O
t BHHQCPCPBRHZY +−−++=++ +−− ))1(( 1221111 δ       (5) 
 
Solving the maximization problem of the home-owner yields the follo5ing first 
order conditions for ( )HCC OO ,, 21 :11
                                            
11 If the home-owner’s FOC w.r.t. bond is also derived and combined with the other FOCs, the resulting equation 
becomes a version of the “no-arbitrage” condition. With the consumption of home-owners substituted out in so doing, 
it is impossible to construct a moment condition involving aggregate consumption by which to estimate the 
consumption shares of home-owners or renters.  
The intuition is as follows: if the home-owners are following inter-temporally optimal decisions, optimality 
condition involving either housing investment or bond acquisition is redundant. Unlike home-owners, however, 
renters in the next subsection do not have access to the housing investment, so their dynamic optimality condition 
w.r.t. the bond is indispensible. 
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[ ] ttOtt PCu μω εσεε 1
1
1
111 =−− ,                                            (6) 
 
( ) [ ] ttOtt PCu μω εσεε 2
1
2
111
1 =− −− ,                                       (7) 
 
1111 )1( ++++ +−= tttttttt ZEQEQ μβδμβμ ,                              (8) 
 
where tμ  is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint.  It is worth 
noting that equations (6) and (7) imply 
 
t
t
O
t
O
t
P
P
C
C
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−εε
ω
ω
,                                              (9) 
 
which can be used to pin down the elasticity of substitution between the two 
kinds of consumption.12
We assume that the technology of the competitive housing service firm is C2=ηH, 
with η>0.13 Then, the zero profit condition in turn gives Z=ηP2t, which is used to 
substitute out Z in (7). After re-arranging log-linearized versions of equations (6), (7), 
and (8), we get: 
 
1,21
1,221,11,11
22111
ˆ))1(1(ˆ)1(
ˆˆ1ˆ
ˆˆ1ˆˆ
++
+++
−−+−+
Θ−−Θ=
Θ−−Θ+
tttt
tttttt
tttt
PEQE
PECEPE
PCPQ
δβδβ
σ
σ
                              (10) 
 
Where 
 
111)1(1 −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −Ξ−=Θ σεε , 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −Ξ−=Θ σεε
11)1(2  
                                            
12 Since equation (8) holds for renters as well, it holds for aggregate consumption. 
13 In fact, we can further normalize η to be one, without causing any changes in the results that follows. 
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and  is the ratio Ξ
ε
ε
εε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
ωω
ω
1
2
11
1
1
1
1
1
)1(
−−
−
−+ CC
C
 evaluated in steady state. 
 
 
3.2 Renters 
 
Without access to the housing investment market, a representative renter 
maximizes 
 
( )∑∞
=
−
−0
/11
210 ,/11
1
t
tt
t CCuE σγγσβ , 10 << β , 0>σ          (11) 
 
subject to her budget constraint 
 
r
t
r
tt
r
tt
r
tt
r
t BCPCPBRY ++=+ −− 221111                   (12) 
 
where the superscript r denotes renters' choice variables.  
The first order conditions for ( )BCC ,, 21  are given by 
 
[ ] γεσεε μω ttrtrt PCu 111111 =−−                                  (13) 
 
( ) [ ] γεγσεγε μω tttt PCu 2121111 =− −−                                      (14) 
 
γγ μβμ 1+= tttt ER .                                                     (15) 
 
 After re-arranging log-linearized versions of (13), (14), and (15), we get 
 
.ˆˆ1ˆˆ
,ˆˆ1ˆ
1,221,11,11
22111
+++ Θ−−Θ+=
Θ−−Θ
ttttttt
ttt
PECEPER
PCP
γ
γ
σ
σ                          (16) 
 
 
3.3 Aggregation  
 
Suppose that the economy is inhabited by [ ]1,0∈θ  fraction of owner-occupiers 
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and θ−1  fraction of renters, so that the aggregate consumption is determined as 
 
γθθ tOtt CCC )1( −+= .                                     (17) 
 
If log-linearized around steady state, (16) yields 
 
γ
t
O
tt CCC ˆ)1(ˆˆ Λ−+Λ=                               (17a) 
 
where Λ is the steady state share  of home-owners’ consumption.CCO /θ 14 We 
can further deduce from (9) and (4) that the same share Λ  is applicable to the 
aggregation of  or  individually. 1 2
Combining (10) and (16) in view of (17a) gives 
C C
 [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] .ˆ)1(1ˆ)1(ˆ)1(ˆ
ˆˆˆˆˆˆ1
1,21
21,2211,111,11
++
+++
−−Λ+Λ−−−−Λ=
−Θ−−Θ+−
tttttt
ttttttttt
PERQEQ
PPEPPECEC
δβδβ
σ        (18) 
 
 
4. Model (II) 
 
We consider another endowment economy in which the renters are, on top of the 
lack of access to the housing investment market, described as the so-called 
rule-of-thumb consumers: they do not smooth their consumption path in the face of 
fluctuations in their period-by-period endowment income. The behavior of 
home-owners in this economy is the same as in Model (I). 
In each period, a representative renter solves the static problem of maximizing 
his period utility 
 ( )γγ tt CCu 21 ,                                   (19) 
 
subject to the constraint 
 
γγγ
ttttt CPCPY 2211 +=                                  (20) 
 
that all his endowment income is consumed in each period. 
From the intratemporal optimization condition (9) and the budget constraint (20), 
we have 
 
                                            
14 θ  and  are different even in a steady state because the economy is populated by heterogeneous households. Λ
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( )[ ] )1)(1(ˆ1ˆˆˆ 323311 εσεσσσ γγ −Θ−+Θ−+Θ+−=− tttt PPYC         (21) 
 
where is the renters’ share of non-housing consumption expenditure 
 in steady state, which is equal to 
3Θ
γγ YCP /11 εε
ε
ωω
ω
−−
−
−+ 1211
1
1
)1( PP
P .15
We now combine the log-linearized versions of (10) for home-owners and (21) for 
renters, with weight of Λ and 1-Λ, respectively. Using r
tttt
o
tt CECECE 111 ˆ
1ˆ1ˆ
Λ
Λ−−Λ= , 
we finally have the following equation for aggregate non-housing consumption: 
 [ ]
[ ] [
[ ]
]
[ ]
.ˆ)1)(1(1
ˆ))1((1
ˆ)1)(1)(1(
ˆ))1()(1()1(
ˆˆ1ˆ)1(1
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆ)1(ˆˆ1
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1111,2
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−−−−Λ+
−ΛΘ−−ΛΘ+
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tttttt
ttttt
PE
PE
P
PY
CECPE
PEPPEP
QEQYE
εσ
εσ
εσ
εσσ
σδβ
δβσ
γ
γ
                          (22) 
 
 
5. Estimation 
 
We estimate the (steady state) share Λ  of home-owner's consumption using the 
aggregate Euler equations (18) and (22) for the two models. Involving endogenous 
expectational errors, those equations are cast into the form 
 [ ] 01 =+ ttt XME                                                        (23) 
 
for a vector t  of variables dated t and earlier. We apply GMM to the 
orthogonality condition (23). 
X
To simplify the estimation procedure, we opt to estimate the pair of ( Λ, )σ . The 
values of ( )εω,  are fixed at (0.868, 0.454), which are obtained by applying OLS to 
                                            
15 We use the budget constraint (19) and the CES aggregator to derive this result. 
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(9). is fixed at the sample mean of its data counterpart calculated using the above 
estimates. The rate of depreciation 
Ξ δ  of housing stock is fixed at 0.007, matching 
the annual rate estimated for the U.S. by Harding et al. (2004), and β  is fixed at the 
conventional rate of 0.99. Finally, 3Θ  is fixed at the corresponding sample average. 
We use quarterly Korean data for the period 1987:Q1 to 2003:Q4. The aggregate 
non-housing consumption 1  is the same series used for the time series regression 
in section 2. The price series 
C ( )21 of non-housing and housing consumption, 
respectively, are proxied by corresponding implicit deflators available from the 
national income account, and the housing price  is the nationwide house price 
index reported by Kookmin Bank. All price variables are deflated by the CPI. The 
real interest rate 
,PP
Q
R  is the 3-year corporate bond rate adjusted for ex-post CPI 
inflation. For the endowment γt of renters in the second model economy, we use 
per capita GNI resorting to the assumption that the endowment profile is identical 
for all households. Since variables in equations (18) and (22) are represented in 
log-deviations from steady state levels, we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to 
construct correspondingly transformed series. 
Y
The left panel of Table 6 reports the estimation results for Model (I). In column (1), 
the second to fourth lags of  are used as instruments, while lags 
of 2  not appearing in the moment condition are dropped in column (2). The 
estimated elasticities of intertemporal substitution imply that the utility function is 
close to the logarithmic function in both columns, but the estimate 0.769 of  in 
column (2) is higher than 0.659 in column (1). Both parameters are estimated sharply, 
as reflected in their t-values. 
( RQPPCC ,,,,, 2121 )C
Λ
The estimation results for Model (II) are reported in the right panel of Table III. In 
column (3), the second to fourth lags of ( )YRQPPCC ,,,,,, 2121  are used as 
instruments, while lags of 2  not appearing in the moment condition (8) are again 
dropped in column (4). The estimates of 
C σ  and Λ  for Model (II) tend to be lower 
than those for Model (I): the estimates of σ , ranging at around 0.8 to 0.9, are 
significantly lower than for Model (I) at a 5% significance level but not at the 1% level. 
The estimates of , now ranging from 0.61 to 0.64, are not much different from that 
of Model (I). We believe the slightly lower estimates of 
Λ Λ  in Model (II) better 
represent the situation that renters are more likely to behave as “rule-of-thumb” 
consumers, rather than being able to smooth their consumption over time.16 That 
being the case, the consumption share of renters latent in the aggregate data series 
will be better captured by the latter model. It is also worth noting that the estimate of 
 is not very different from a similar estimate in Campbell and Mankiw (1989): 
they estimate the “mass” of consumers who do not borrow or save to smooth 
consumption to be in the neighborhood of 0.4. If we view the renters as unable to 
draw resources from housing wealth to smooth consumption, then our estimates of 
 are comparable to those in Campbell and Mankiw (1989), although our estimates 
give the consumption share, not the “mass”, of constrained households. 
Λ
Λ
                                            
16 In 2000, the home ownership ratio in Seoul was 53.4%, and the weighted average of home ownership ratios in 
seven major cities was 56.6% if the numbers of households in each city are used as weights. The average home 
ownership rate nationwide is 61.0%. The estimated share Λ is therefore higher than the “mass” of home-owners, 
which appears plausible: the consumption of a home owner will be higher than that of a renter. 
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<Table 6> GMM Estimation of the Euler Equation 
 
Model I Model II 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
σ  1.230  (3.72) 1.267  (3.89) 0.894 (18.81) 0.808 (13.35) 
Λ  0.659  (2.91) 0.769  (3.02) 0.613 (2.97) 0.639 (2.19) 
Instruments 4,12,1 ,..., −− tt CC  4,12,1 ,..., −− tt CC  4,12,1 ,..., −− tt CC  4,12,1 ,..., −− tt CC  
. 4,12,1 ,..., −− tt PP  4,12,1 ,..., −− tt PP  4,12,1 ,..., −− tt PP  4,12,1 ,..., −− tt PP  
 42 ,..., −− tt QQ  42 ,..., −− tt QQ  42 ,..., −− tt QQ  42,..., −− tt QQ  
 42 ,..., −− tt RR  42 ,..., −− tt RR  42 ,..., −− tt RR  42 ,..., −− tt RR  
 4,22,2 ,..., −− tt CC   rt
r
t YY 42 ,..., −−  
r
t
r
t YY 42 ,..., −−  
   4,22,2 ,..., −− tt CC   
J – stat. 0.764 0.891 0.753 0.778 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values calculated by HAC standard errors of Newey-West (1987). 
Numbers in the last row are p-values associated with Hansen’s (1982) J-test for the model’s 
overidentifying restrictions. 
 
 
 
6. Interpretation 
 
In this subsection, we develop an intuitive idea on how much to revise the 
measure of housing wealth effects estimated with aggregate (across home-owners 
and renters) time series. To simplify the argument, we assume the following 
relations 
 
OO HWC εα +=   
γγ εβ += HWC                                                      (24) 
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where and are the consumption of home-owners and renters, 
respectively, and is the total housing wealth. If the two consumption series 
were available, the OLS estimate of 
OC γC
HW α  would correspond to the “textbook” 
definition of the housing wealth effect, while that of β  would measure the degree 
of negative income effect on renters coming from increases in housing prices. 
Now suppose that a relation analogous to (12) is estimated for per capita 
consumption , which is the weighted sum of two strands of 
households' consumption. If we denote the resulting estimate by 
C rO CC )1( Λ−+Λ γˆ , it follows that 
the OLS estimates ( )γβα ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  have the following relation: 
 
βγα ˆ1ˆˆ Λ
Λ−−Λ= .                                                    (25) 
 
Equation (25) shows that how well the aggregate estimate γˆ  reflects the 
hypothetical “home-owners only” estimate αˆ  depends on  and βˆ Λ . 
Obviously, if is close to one, Λ γˆ  is not much different from the degree of a 
genuine housing wealth effect. However, if Λ is substantially smaller than 1, γˆ  is 
likely to fall short ofαˆ , the measure of genuine wealth effect. Another reason γˆ  
may underestimate housing wealth effect per se is that β  is significantly smaller 
than αˆ . As shown in section 2, the time series regression results in Table I strongly 
support that  would be significantly smaller than βˆ αˆ , and possibly even 
negative. 
If we put , which we think is not much of an extreme assumption for 
renters, the estimates Λ  in Table 1 imply that 0
ˆ =β αˆ recovered from the estimates 
(controlled for the possible endogeneity problem) in the second panel for 
non-housing consumption in Table 3 ranges around 0.144 on average. The estimates 
of housing wealth effects thus revised tend to be larger than the cross sectional 
estimates in Table 4 ranging around 0.1. We may view the number 0.144 as the upper 
bound of the ‘genuine’ housing wealth effects we want to estimate. 
    
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper, we examine the effects of housing wealth on consumption in Korea. 
Traditionally, the literature on housing wealth effect has mainly focused on 
estimating the effects of housing wealth on aggregate consumption. Unlike those 
previous studies, our interest lies in understanding the ‘genuine’ housing wealth 
effects, i.e., the response of consumption spending by home-owners to the changes in 
housing wealth. 
We raise two issues, the one around home-ownership and the other around the 
proper measure of consumption, that matter in estimating the genuine housing 
wealth effect using aggregate time series. Dealing with the latter, we argue that it is 
more appropriate to use non-housing consumption. To the extent that most 
home-owners purchase housing units to live in, the changes in housing consumption 
by home owners are not of their own choices but artificially imputed on them. 
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On top of that, we proceed to address the issue of home ownership. Our strategy 
is to examine how much to revise the estimates housing wealth effect obtained from 
aggregate non-housing consumption data. We construct two structural models and 
estimate the share of home-owners' consumption in those models' context. It is found 
that, if revised in light of the estimated consumption shares of home-owners, the 
magnitude of resulting housing wealth effects may be larger than what simple time 
series regressions tell us. 
We believe grasping the size of ‘genuine’ wealth effect has some macroeconomic 
implications. Policymakers are usually interested in understanding the effect of 
housing wealth on aggregate consumption. Seeing that the ratio of home-owners has 
been steadily increasing, however, estimates of housing wealth effects based on past 
data and not taking such trend into account may understate the importance of 
housing wealth for stabilization policy in the present and near future. 
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Appendix  
 
 
In this section, we summarize the steps followed in deriving the regression 
equation (1) from the utility maximization problem in the subsection 2.1. 
The FOCs w.r.t (C1,C2) are combined together into  
 
,112 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −= − ω
ωεPCC
                                                 
(A1)
 
 where P = P2/P1. 
Combining (A1) and the budget constraint, we get 
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(A2)  
 If log-linearized aound the steady state, equation (A2) can be represented as 
 SWHWYPConstC logloglogloglog 321111 Ψ+Ψ+Ψ+Θ+=
    
(A3)
 
 where Const1 corresponds to the steady state around which (A2) is log-linearized, 
and the coefficients are given by the following steady state values: 
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Using (A1), we get a similar relation for logC2  given by 
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Note that the coefficient 1 on logP may have either signs for the non-housing 
consumption ( 1C ), depending on the magnitude of ε measuring the elasticity of 
substitution between the two kinds of consumption. In contrast, the coefficient 
for the housing consumption ( ) is negative.
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